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CASE COMMENTS

when it is clear that the partners have agreed to create specific rights and
obligations as among or between themselves, and when the extent of such
rights and obligations is readily ascertainable without an accounting, recourse pursuant to the partnership agreement is proper even absent a
dissolution, winding up, and settlement of partnership accounts. 544
M.

LAaoR RELATIONS

Wilson v. City of Charlotte

964 F.2d 1391 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc)
Prior to 1985, the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)5 41 were not applicable to state and local
public employers. Consequently, a public employer could legally provide
compensatory leave in lieu of monetary compensation for overtime hours.
State and local public employer immunity from the FLSA overtime requirements evaporated, however, with the Supreme Court's decision in Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.54
In amending the FLSA to bring the Act in line with the Garcia decision,
Congress attempted to ease the financial burden that providing cash overtime
compensation would place on public employers by enabling them to imple-

ognizing that although partnership has not undergone final accounting, partner may maintain
action at law against partnership when doing so requires no complex accounting); Warren v.
Warren, 784 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that final accounting is not
prerequisite to action at law between partners where items sued on are few and simple of
solution); Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d 801, 807 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (stating that prior
final accounting is unnecessary for maintenance of action at law between partners based on
partnership transactions where facts are such that no complex accounting is necessary); Pilch v.
Milikin, 19 Cal. Rptr. 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1962) (holding that where no complex accounting
involving variety of partnership transactions is necessary, an action at law may be maintained
though winding up and final accounting have not taken place).
544. Gilbert v. Fontaine, 22 F.2d 657, 662 (8th Cir. 1927); see also Giblin v. Anesthesiology
Assocs., 567 N.Y.S.2d 775, 776 (App. Div. 1991) (recognizing that although partnership has not
undergone final accounting, partner may maintain action at law against partnership when doing
so requires no complex accounting); Warren v. Warren, 784 S.W.2d 247, 252 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (recognizing that final accounting is not prerequisite to action at law between partners
where items sued on are few and simple of solution); Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d 801, 807
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (stating that prior final accounting is unnecessary for maintenance of
action at law between partners based on partnership transactions where facts are such that no
complex accounting is necessary); Pilch v. Milikin, 19 Cal. Rptr. 334, 340 (Ct. App. 1962)
(holding that where no complex accounting involving variety of partnership transactions is
necessary, an action at law may be maintained though winding up and final accounting have
not taken place).
545. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-19 (West Supp. 1991).
546. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that public employees, where traditional
governmental functions are involved, are immune from requirements of FLSA), holding that
Congress could require public employers to comply with the FLSA regardless of the nature of
the work. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547.
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ment compensatory leave policies in lieu of monetary payments for overtime. 547 Section 207(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985.4
permits employers to compensate employees with compensatory leave but
only pursuant to an agreement with the employee or the employee's
representative 49 as defined in subsections (2)(A)(i) and (ii) of section 207(o).'"
If no agreement is reached, the Act mandates monetary compensation for
551
overtime work.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first construed section 207(o) in Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach. 552 In Abbott, the

Fourth Circuit held that section 207(o) permits public employers to enter
into individual agreements with its employees when state law has prohibited
the employer from entering into agreements with the employees' represen-

tative. 553 In Wilson v. City of Charlotte, 54 the Fourth Circuit reexamined
the Abbott interpretation of section 207(o).
In December 1985, the City of Charlotte, North Carolina was in the
practice of awarding its fire fighters with compensatory leave for overtime

in lieu of monetary compensation. Disgruntled by this practice, 156 members
of the Charlotte Fire Fighters Association Local 660 notified the City that

Charlotte's policy violated section 207(o) of the FLSA because the City had
not reached an agreement with the fire fighters' representative regarding the
547. Wilson v. City of Charlotte, 964 F.2d 1391, 1393 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
548. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, § 2(a), 99 Stat. 787
(1985) (added 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(o)). Section 207(o) provides in relevant part:
(1) Employees of a public agency which is a state, a political subdivision of a State,
or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with this subsection
and in lieu of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than
one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation
is required by this section.
(2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1) only(A) pursuant to(i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of
understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees; or
(ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause(i), an agreement or
understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work; and
(B) ...
In the case of employees described in clause (A)(ii) hired before April 15, 1986, the
regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with respect to compensatory time off for
such employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an
agreement or understanding under such clause (A)(ii). Except as provided in the
previous sentence, the provision of compensatory time off to such employees for hours
worked after April 14, 1986, shall be in accordance with this subsection.
Id.
549. Wilson, 964 F.2d at 1394.
550. Id.
551. Id.

552. 879 F.2d 132 (4th Cir. 1989).
553. Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1989).
554. 964 F.2d 1391 (4th Cir. 1992).
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use of compensatory time off in lieu of monetary compensation. Because
the fire fighters' had designated Local 660 of the International Association
of Fire Fighters as their representative, and because North Carolina law
prohibited state and local governmental units from contracting with labor
unions, the City refused to bargain with Local 660. Consequently, the fire
fighters brought an action against the City in the United States District
Court for the Western District of North Carolina claiming that the City's
failure to recognize and negotiate with Local 660 violated section 207(o) of
the FLSA.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the fire
fighters. The district court rejected the City's argument that it was permitted
to award compensatory leave without the union's consent because the City
was precluded by state law from entering into an agreement with Local
660. The district court declared that under FLSA, a public employer could
only substitute compensatory leave for monetary compensation when the
employer reached an agreement with the employees' designated representative. According to the district court, if the employer did not reach such an
agreement or could not enter into an agreement with the employees' designated representative because of state law, the employer was statutorily
bound to pay monetary compensation for overtime work. The City appealed
arguing that the district court incorrectly interpreted the language of section
207(o). The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.
In Wilson, the Fourth Circuit noted that section 207(o) recognizes three
types of agreements-two express and one statutorily imposed agreement.
Subsection 207(o)(2)(A)(i) provides for an express agreement between the
employer and the employees' representative. Subsection (A)(ii) provides for
an express agreement between the employer and employees not covered by
subsection (A)(i). Subsection 207(o)(2)(B) provides for a statutory imposed
agreement under subsection (2)(ii). Pursuant to subsection (2)(B), if an
employer had a regular practice of providing compensatory leave in lieu of
monetary compensation for overtime work in effect on April 15, 1986, this
practice constitutes an agreement between the employer and any employee
described in subsection (A)(ii) hired before April 15, 1986.
The issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the employees' designation of a.representative or the employer's recognition of a representative
triggered the application of subsection (A)(i). Turning to the regulations
promulgated in implementing section 207(o), the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the Secretary of Labor intended that state or local law would determine
whether an employee had a representative for the purposes of subsection
(A)(i). Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that the employees did not
have a representative for purposes of subsection (A)(i) because North
Carolina law prohibited the City from entering into an agreement with
Local 660. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that subsection
(A)(i) did not cover the fire fighters.
There was no question that the City and fire fighters had not reached
an agreement and that the City had hired the fire fighters prior to April
15, 1986. Because the City had a regular practice in effect as of April 15,
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1986 of providing compensatory leave for overtime work, that practice
constituted an agreement under subsection (A)(ii). The Fourth Circuit held
that, by virtue of this statutorily imposed agreement, the City could continue
to provide compensatory time for overtime work.
Judge Luttig, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the majority's
finding that the City was precluded from reaching an agreement with Local
660. Judge Luttig agreed with the dissent and the fire fighters that Local
660 was a representative within the meaning of the statute but disagreed
with the majority's finding that the statute required the employer to reach
an agreement with the representative. Although the City could have entered
into an agreement with Local 660, the FLSA did not require the City to
do so.
Judge Luttig also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the
language "not covered by subsection (A)(i)" found in subsection (A)(ii).
According to the majority, subsection (A)(i) did not cover the fire fighters
because they did not have a recognized representative. Judge Luttig, however, found that because no agreement had been reached between the City
and Local 660, the fire fighters were not covered by subsection (A)(i). This
distinction in interpretation was critical to Judge Luttig because under the
majority's interpretation, if state law permitted the employer to enter into
an agreement with the employees' representative, the City had to reach an
agreement with the representative before it could award compensatory time
off. However, under Judge Luttig's interpretation, the statute did not require
the employer to reach an agreement with the representative. If the employer
did not reach an agreement with the employees' representative, for whatever
reason, the City was free to engage in negotiation with the employee
individually.
Chief Judge Ervin, writing for the five member dissent, argued that
merely by designating a representative, employees are "represented" for
purposes of subsection (A)(i), and that the representative need not be
recognized by the employer. Chief Judge Ervin, therefore, agreed with the
district court's finding that the Act did not permit the City to take advantage
of compensatory leave without entering into an agreement with Local 660.
The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the term "representative" is
consistent with the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits. These circuits have held that an employer is not
required to pay its employees for overtime hours in the absence of a
negotiated compensatory time agreement with the employees' designated
representative when such an agreement is prohibited by state law. 5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, has ruled
differently.5 56 The Tenth Circuit has held, like the dissent in Wilson, that
555. Moreau V. Klevenhagen, 956 F.2d 516 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992);
Nevada Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Nevada, 899 F.2d 1549 (9th Cir. 1990); Dillard v. Harris, 885
F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
556. International Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 2203 v. West Adams County Fire Protection
Dist., 877 F.2d 814 (10th Cir. 1989).

